Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 8

January 1982

Federal Practice & Procedure
Tom C. Clark
Susan A. Bush

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Other Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Tom C. Clark and Susan A. Bush, Federal Practice & Procedure, 12 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1982).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure

FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE
I. TOWARD
POLICY

A.

A

BALANCED

JUDICIAL

IMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION

In Rankin v. Howard,l the Ninth Circuit, interpreting a recent Supreme Court decision, held that judicial power exercised
in the clear absence of personal jurisdiction may give rise to the
judge's personal monetary liability. The Rankin court made it
clear that a judge who agrees upon a ruling prior to a hearing is
not immune from suit.
.
On Christmas Day, 1976, the defendant Judge Zeller held a
guardianship proceeding upon the application of Wayne Howard, an attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Rankin. The Rankins sought
to have their son, the plaintiff, "deprogrammed"l from his reli1. 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were Ferguson, J. and Brown, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981).
2. Id. "Deprogramming" is a phenomenon involving the removal of the subject, usually a cult member, from his or her supportive environment and, while thus confined or
isolated from other cult members, continually lecturing and cajoling the person in an
aggreBSive manner, all in an attempt to bring the subject back to "reality." Cult, in this
context, is defined as "a minority religious group holding beliefs regarded as unorthodox
or spurious." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 552 (3d ed. 1971). Typically such "therapy" occurs, after physical abduction of the cult member, in locked motel
rooms, during marathon sessions by teams of lay "deprogrammers." For the views of a
veteran of over 1,000 successful "deprogrammings," see T. PATRICK, LET OUR CHILDREN
Go! (1976). For a comprehensive and generally favorable treatment of "deprogramming"
policy iBSues, see Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under
the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. I, 5-6, 88-91 (1977). Criticisms of "deprogramming" abound: Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 29 CHURCH AND STATE 212 (1977);
Robbins, Even a Moonie Has Civil Rights, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 1977, at 232.
Temporary conservatorships and guardianships commonly afford parents the means
by which to commence "deprogramming." See generally Note, Legal Issues in the Use
of Guardianship Procedures to Remove Members of Cults, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 1095 (1976);
Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1247 (1978). The use of temporary conservatorships for this purpose has
ceased in California. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234
(1977).
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gious faith. 8 Both the plaintiff and his parents resided in Missouri. 4 Howard incorrectly stated on the guardianship application that the proposed ward resided in Kansas. 6 In the
proceeding, the defendant judge issued an ex parte guardianship
order.6 Later that day, plaintiff's father flew him to Kansas, ostensibly to visit friends.' Howard, also a defendant, and two
sheriffs met plaintiff and his father at the airport. 8 On the authority of the guardianship order, the sheriffs forcibly took
plaintiff into custody and placed him on a flight to Arizona.·
There, plaintiff was confined and subjected to "deprogramming"
for nine days.lo
Plaintiff sued the participants in the scheme, including
Judge Zeller, pursuant to three sections of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act,n and also alleged common law torts. II Plaintiff claimed that
3. The plaintiff Marcus Rankin is an adult member of the Unification Church
headed by Reverend Sun Myung Moon. 633 F.2d at 846. One commentator estimates the
membership of the Unification Church at 300,000-750,000. Delgado, supra note 2, at 6.
See Life With Father Moon, NBwsWEEK, June 14, 1976, at 60-66; Religious Cults: Newest Magnet for Youth, U.S. NBws & WORLD RBPORT, June 14, 1976, at 52-54; The Darker
Side of Sun Moon, TUG, June 14, 1976, at 49.
4. 633 F.2d at 846.
5.Id.
6. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Ariz. 1978). The order authorized: (1)
appointment of plaintiff's father as temporary guardian; (2) detention and custody of the
ward; (3) counseling, examination and treatment of the ward by any person; (4) assistance of any law enforcement officer in the state for the location and detention of the
ward. Id. The defendant judge is a Kansas probate judge, vested through Kansas statutes with jurisdiction over guardiaDshipa. Id. at 73. He is not a lawyer. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 846. The proceeding commenced and concluded before the ward entered
the state. Id.
7. 633 F.2d at 846.
8. Brief for Appellant at 18-19.
9.Id.
10. 633 F.2d at 846. Attorney Howard, sometimes working with Pima County Assistant District Attorney Trauscht, had apparently used this technique before. See Brief for
Appellant at 7-8. The plaintiff's confinement occurred first in 8 motel room, then at
Attorney Howard's home, where plaintiff escaped. Brief for Appellant at 8.
11. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Ariz. 1978). Because of the disposition of the statutory claims, only issues arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) are discussed in this case note. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding
for redress.
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the defendant judge, prior to the proceeding, agreed to the
guardianship order and knew of the fraudulent jurisdictional allegations. 18 Plaintiff claimed the order violated a variety of express jurisdictional requirements of the Kansas guardianship
statutes1• and failed to give the proposed ward notice or the opportunity to be heard, all in contravention of the United States
Constitution. 11
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant judge on all claims. 1e The court based its decision on the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity from damages liability for
judicial acts. 1' The Ninth Circuit reversed, setting forth several
significant holdings. 1s First, the court stated that a prior private
agreement on an application's disposition is not a "judicial act"
for which damages immunity lies. Ie Second, judicial acts comFor a discU88ion of other iBBues, see note 16 infra.
12. 633 F.2d at 846. Neither the trial court opinion, Ninth Circuit opinion, nor the
appellate briefs describe the alleged torts.
13.Id.
14. Id. at 847.
15.Id.
16. Id. The judge's co-defendants were granted partial summary judgment on a theory of derivative immunity. Id. This immunity applies to private citizens who conspire
with immune state actors. The theory of derivative immunity disappeared with Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). Accordingly, this Note win not discuBB any derivative immunity issues. Nor will plaintiff's claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 against the judge's c0defendants be analyzed because the significance and focus of Rankin is on judicial
immunity.
17. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. at 73. The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity may be described as the judicial officer's freedom from civil damage suits for judicial
acts performed within the officer's jurisdiction, if the acts fall within the scope of the
immunity. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 987 (4th ed. 1971). The adjective "absolute"
means that the judge's motive, state of mind, or reasonableneBB of conduct is not relevant to the doctrine's application. Id. This definition embodies the discretionary/ministerial distinction governing liability for other public officials. Thus, judicial acts are seen
as discretionary. Id. at 988. Judicial liability for lDinisterial functions is seen in Lynch v.
Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970).
A qualified immunity doctrine provides a complete defense for conduct meeting a
certain standard. See note 90 infra. The most common verbal formula applies immunity
for such acts committed in good faith, such conduct being reasonable at the time. W.
PROSSER, supra at 989. For histories of sovereign and judicial immunity, see Feinman &
Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 201 (1980); Kattan, Knocking
on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damages
Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941 (1977); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827 (1957).
18. 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980).
19. Id. at 847. Injunctive or other equitable relief under § 1983 is not barred by the
judicial immunity doctrine. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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mitted in the clear absence of personal jurisdiction are not
cloaked with immunity.lo Third, a total absence of personal jurisdiction may be found when the absence is known to the judge
or when the judge proceeds recklessly in the face of statute or
case law prohibiting such action.l • Finally, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the historic distinction between acts in excess of jurisdiction and acts in the absence of jurisdiction.II In effect, the
court firmly preserved the policy basis underlying immunity for
excessive acts.I I
B.

A CENTURy-OLD BULWARK AGAINST DAMAGES LIABILITY

Immunity has traditionally been recognized as necessary to
shield a principled and independent judiciary from intimidation
and harassment." Among the justifications for immunity are
that it: (1) prevents influence upon decisions;" (2) saves judges
from the burden of defending retaliatory suits;l. (3) enhances
the attractiveness of judicial service;17 (4) promotes finality in
litigation;l. (5) preserves the appellate process and administration of justice;11I (6) reflects a duty to society as a whole;lo (7)
conserves judicial self-protection;l. and, (8) upholds separation
of powers and federalism. I I
20. 633 F.2d at 848.
21. 1d. at 849.
22.1d.
23.1d.
24. 1d. at 847. See also, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) ("(TJhe
principle, therefore, which exempts judges . . . from liability in a civil action for acta
done by them in the exercise of their judicial functioDS, obtairus in all countries where
there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence."). Justice Douglas enumerated nine
reasons for judicial immunity in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n.4 (1967) (diBBenting
opinion). The Ninth Circuit listed sill. in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.
1965).
25. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
26. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
27. Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315, 329 (Conn. 18(4).
28. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
29.1d.
30. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1965); Sweeney v. Young, 82
N.H. 159, 163, 131 A. 155, 158 (1925). The rationale for this justification flows thus:
Because judges owe no duty to individual litigants and individuals must establish a duty
not to commit the act, individuals can not establish judicial liability.
31. Grimm v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 264, 564 P.2d 1227, 1231
(1977); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative OfficerlJ, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 272
(1937).
32. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n.4 (1967).
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In Bradley v. Fisher,ss the Supreme Court first articulated
the modern standard of judicial immunity.a. There the Court required the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" as a condition of a
judge's civil liability for judicial acts. sa This rule has remained
essentially untouched until now. se Pursuant to this traditional
theory, judges who act in excess of the court's jurisdiction, even
if committed maliciously or recklessly, were immune from civil
suit.8'7 Three elements figured prominently in the rationale of
Bradley: (1) judicial independence would be eroded through artful pleading of partiality, corruption, or maliciousness;se (2) excessive resources would be spent by requiring one judge to answer before another-perhaps one of inferior standing-at the
behest of a losing party, and forcing judges to preserve every
item of evidence in every case to later prove their integrity;at
and (3) respect for the judiciary would be diminished by the absence of immunity.·o
33. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
34. In Bradley, the plaintiff represented a man accused oC slaying Abraham Lincoln;
deCendant was the trial judge. At the close oC trial, deCendant removed plaintiff's name
Crom the role oC attorneys admitted to practice in that court because plaintiff had
threatened the judge with "personal chastisement." rd. at 344. For his part, plaintiff
claimed insults directed at him Crom the bench provoked his response. rd.
Justices Davis and Clifford dissented "Crom the rule laid down by the majority oC
the court, that a judge is exempt Crom liability in a case like the present, where it is
alleged not only that his proceeding was in excess oC jurisdiction, but that he acted maliciously and corruptly. If he did 80, he is ... subject to suit the same as a private person
would be under like circumstances." rd.
Three years beCore Bradley, Justice Field hinted that judges could be held liable for
malicious acts in excess of their jurisdiction. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523,
536 (1868). The Bradley decision, also by Justice Field, dismissed this implication as
dictum. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
The Bradley Court also dropped the distinction between courts of general jurisdic·
tion and courts of inferior jurisdiction for the purposes of immunity from suit. rd. The
courts of some American states as well as England settled absolute immunity only upon
superior courts of general jurisdiction, reserving for the lower courts immunity only Cor
acts committed in good faith-a qualified immunity. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers
Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325·27 (1969).
35. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
36. Only five reported Supreme Court cases have dealt directly with judicial immu·
nity: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Alzua
v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall
v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). Only Stump and Pierson address the conflict
between § 1983 and the judicial immunity doctrine. See Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848,
857 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981).
37. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
38. rd. at 354.
39. rd. at 349. This requirement would also apply to the second judge.
40. rd. at 347.
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Nearly coincident with the announcement of the Bradley
doctrine, Congress enacted section 1983u as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. Congress intended this reconstruction era
package of legislation as a vehicle to redress misconduct on the
part of state officials and those acting under color of state law.4J
Section 1983 and the judicial immunity doctrine of Bradley represented antagonistic currents in the law. The former sought to
create liability; the latter to deny it. This tension remained
largely theoretical until resolved in Pierson v. Ray,4a in which
the Court held that section 1983 did not disturb the common
law judicial immunity doctrine. 44
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
subject of judicial immunity demonstrates both the longevity
and vitality of the Bradley rule. In Stump v. Sparkman,fa the
Court reversed· a Seventh Circuit decision by holding a state
court judge immune from a section 1983 suit for his ex parte
order of a minor's sterilization upon the petition of the minor's
mother.4a The holding of Stump is a vivid example of the minimal showing required to meet Bradley's two prerequisites for
immunity: a "judicial act" and the lack of a "clear absence of all
jurisdiction. ".,
The Stump Court outlined two factors which breathe con41. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976).
42. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-40, 239-40 n.30 (1972) (state courts at the
time of enactment were being used to deprive citizens of federal rights); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) (purpose of § 1983 was to enforce the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment against all state action-executive, legislative and judicial).
43. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A notable exception is Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945) (Congress possesses power to wipe out common law judicial
immunity, and did so by enacting § 1983), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 776 (1947). Picking was
overruled by Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
(1967).
44. 386 U.S. at 553-54.
45. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
46. The petition alleged that the minor daughter was "somewhat retarded," had
spent the night with older males and stated the mother's desire to prevent "unfortunate
circumstances." Id. at 351-52 n.1. The daughter had regularly graduated from grade to
grade in her public school. Nevertheless, the lower court approved the petition and the
procedure was performed. Id. at 352. Two years later the minor married. Unable to conceive, the young couple visited a physician, and for the first time learned that the "appendectomy" performed after the petition was granted was, in fact, a tubal ligation. Id.
at 353. The petitioner failed to file the petition. The petition did not appear on the
docket. The minor received no notice, guardian ad litem, or hearing. Id. at 360.
47. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348, 351.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/8

6

Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure

1982]

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

193

tent into the notion of a judicial act. U A judicial act is either "a
function normally performed by a judge" (a functional perspective),49 a situation where the parties have "dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity" (an expectational perspective),IIO or some
admixture of the two. III The Stump Court found both factors in
the situation before it. liS
The remarkably informal features of the sterilization proceedingll3 as set out in Justice Stewart's dissent did not sway the
majority. The functional factor of the majority's test of a judicial
act existed because judges commonly "approve petitions relating
to the affairs of minors, as for example, a petition to settle a
minor's claim. "11. The court found the expectational aspect based
on an inference "from the record that it was only because Judge
Stump served in that position [county circuit court judge] that
Mrs. McFarlin, on the advice of counsel, submitted the petition
to him for his approval."1111 While the petitioner undoubtedly appeared before Judge Stump because of his office, such an application of the expectational factor is little help in distinguishing a
proper judicial act from improper overreaching." Clearly,
Stump means that serious procedural due process errors offer no
grounds for judicial liability. II'
The Stump decision is important for its treatment of the
"clear absence of all jurisdiction" prerequisite of monetary personal liability for judges. Simply stated, Judge Stump's court
was not totally devoid of jurisdiction, since apparently no state
statute or case law prohibited such action. 1I8 A general jurisdictional statute empowered the defendant judge to hear "all cases
at law and in equity whatsoever" and all "causes, matters and
48. 435 U.S. at 360.
49. Jd. at 362.
50. Jd.
51. Jd.
52. Jd.

53. See note 46 supra.
54. 435 U.S. at 362.
55. Jd.
56. Justice Stewart's pithy retort summarizes the objection: "A judge is not free, like
a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting
in his judicial capacity." Jd. at 367 (footnote omitted).
57. Jd. at 359.
58. Jd. at 358.
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proceedings."119 By finding the judge's jurisdiction not specifically foreclosed, the Supreme Court could not find it clearly
absent.eo
The dissenters never reached the jurisdictional matter. Justice Stewart found the judge's conduct nonjudicial and remarked
that the majority's holding was "based on dangerously broad criteria."el In a separate dissent, Justice Powell focused on the
nonreviewable quality of the sterilization proceeding as a critical
fact which distinguished it from the disbarment in Bradley.a" He
found that· Bradley's foundational policy-namely that private
rights may be diminished in the greater public interest of an independent judiciary, and relegated to other forums for their vindication-should not apply to the sterilized minor since she
lacked appellate or alternative remedies. as

C.

TAILORING AN EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY POLICY

When the Rankin trial court granted summary judgment for
the defendant judge, it "assumed that a court arguably having
subject matter jurisdiction does not act in the 'clear absence of
all jurisdiction.' "N In deciding an issue of first impression, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the absence of personal jurisdiction
constitutes a clear absence of jurisdiction for two reasons."
First, the requirements of subject matter and personal jurisdiction are conjunctional, since both are necessary for lawful adjudication." Thus, the absence of either amounts to a total ab59. Id. at 357.
6O.ld.
61. Id. at 367-68 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 369.
63. Id. at 370.
64. 633 F.2d at 848.
65.ld.
66. Id. The Fifth Circuit has apparently adopted a contrary stance as to whether a
clear absence of personal jurisdiction destroys immunity. In Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d
848 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit interpreted Stump as "extend[ingJ the protection
of judicial immunity to all 'judicial acts' unless those acts fall clearly outside the judge's
subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 858 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also id.
at 860 n.21 (test for judicial immunity is a "judicial act not clearly outside his subject
matter jurisdiction"). A close reading of Stump indicates that personal jurisdiction did
not appear as an issue. Thus Stump does not foreclose the colorable presence of personal
jurisdiction as an element of judicial immunity. While the Harper decision did not deal
directly with an issue of personal jurisdiction, the court noted "that Stump mandates a
broad construction of the term 'jurisdiction.''' 1d. at 858 n.16. This expansive interpretation conforms to the tone of other Fifth Circuit decisions, as set out in note 77 infra. If
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sence of jurisdiction. More importantly, however, the Ninth
Circuit stated that since "the limits of personal jurisdiction constrain judicial authority, acts taken in the absence of personal
jurisdiction do not fall within the scope of legitimate decisionmaking that judicial immunity is designed to protect. "87 The
presence of immunity is directly related to judicial authority."
What Stump only intimated concerning proof of jurisdictional issues, the Rankin court expressed. The Ninth Circuit
held that when the defendant judge either knew the jurisdictional pleadings to be false, or proceeded in the face of valid
statutory or case law denying him jurisdiction, proof of the lack
of jurisdiction is met. 89 It is fundamental that a court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction,70 but that alone does not
confer immunity. For an erroneous, but well-founded, determination, no liability exists. 71
In Rankin, the Ninth Circuit applied the expectational and
functional factors articulated in Stump to conclude that predetermination of a guardianship petition is a nonjudicial act. First,
the Ninth Circuit noted the proposed ward's expectation of judicial impartiality was frustrated.71 Second, the appellate court
this is the view of the Fifth Circuit, a conflict among the circuits awaits Supreme Court
resolution. For criticism of the expansive theory of judicial immunity, see text accompanying note 77 infra. The impact of Harper on the "judicial act" analytical strand is also
discussed at note 77 infra.
67. 633 F.2d at 849.
68. In a recent case, O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981), the
Ninth Circuit applied the distinction between excessive jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction for immunity purposes in an interpretation of Rankin. In O'Neil, the defendant
judge apparently mistook a bench warrant for an indirect contempt of court charge and
sentenced plaintiff to two days in jail. Id. at 368. An indirect contempt charge is one
based on events outside the view of the judge entering judgment.ld. An affidavit making
the charge and describing the events is expressly required by state law. Id. No such
affidavit existed prior to the entry of judgment. Id. Plaintiff won compensatory and punitive damages against defendant under § 1983. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that judicial immunity prevented suit. The defendant judge's failure to comply with the
procedural requirements for an indirect contempt charge prior to sentencing, though a
judicial act, reflected an act in excess, not absence, of jurisdiction. Id. at 369. The trial
court had erroneously believed that the imperfect discharge of statutory duties conferring jurisdiction over indirect contempt hearings amounted to a clear absence of jurisdiction.ld.
69. 633 F.2d at 849 n.14.
70. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330·U.S. 258 (1947); C. WRIGHT,
LAW or FEDERAL COURTS 57-58 (3d ed. 1976).
71. 633 F.2d at 849.
72. Id. at 847.
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recognized that an agreement to make a particular ruling in advance is not a "function normally performed by a judge.""
Rather, it is the opposite of that which judicial immunity seeks
to protect-i.e., "principled and fearless decisionmaking.''''·
The Ninth Circuit's formulation appears to have adopted
Justice Stewart's definition of a judicial act.n Justice Stewart
recommended that "the concept of what is a judicial act must
take its content from a consideration of the factors that support
immunity from liability for the performance of such an act.''''·
Though the Ninth Circuit accomplished a verbal blending of the
two views, its application of the critical factors implies the primacy of Justice Stewart's suggestion." An earlier opinion by the
Rankin court strengthened this interpretation" when it stated
73.1d.
74.1d.
75. Id. n.8 ("[W]e do not believe that the majority meant to deny the relevance of
the doctrine's purpose in determining its scope.").
76. 435 U.S. at 368.
77. 633 F.2d at 847. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a virtually limitless view of what
makes a judicial act. Harper v. Merckle. observed:
Thus we take as settled law the proposition that [in] the vast
mlijority of section 1983 cases in which judges are named as
defendants, judicial immunity will bar the action. Moreover.
as our analysis' . . . reveals. we can envision no situation-where a judge acts after he is approached qua judge by
parties to a case-that could possibly spawn a successful section 1983 suit.
638 F.2d 848, 856 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original).
In McAlester v. Brown. 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit reflected this
view of judicial immunity. Pertinent comments include the following:
We note in concluding that the opening of any inroads
weakening judicial immunity could have the gravest consequences to our system of justice.... To be sure. we can conjure converse chambers of horrors. but we cannot allow that to
erode the necessary features of the immunity. That judicial
immunity is sometimes used as an offensive dagger rather
than a defensive shield must not justify derogating its inviolability. Even though there may be an occasional diabolical or
venal judicial act, the independence of the judiciary must not
be sacrificed one microscopic portion of a millimeter, lest the
fears of section 1983 intrusions cow the judge from his duty.
Id. at 1283 (footnote omitted).
In Harper. the Fifth Circuit claimed that the McAlester decision is the source of the
Stump factors. Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d at 858. A view of judicial immunity that
vests upon such an intangible definition of judicial act cuts the doctrine free from its
policy bases. See notes 25-32 supra and accompanying text for the policies behind judicial immunity.
78. Gregory v. Thompson. 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). The Gregory court held the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/8

10

Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure

1982]

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

197

that" [w ]hat constitutes conduct falling within that range [of judicial acts] must, in large part, be determined by looking at the
purpose underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity."'·
D.

ANALYSIS

Neither controversy nor fear of reprisal should deter a court
from undertaking a difficult jurisdictional question. Neither
Rankin nor Stump enunciated the requisite quantum of jurisdictional certainty. The Rankin court, however, stood by the
proposition that the bedrock basis for judicial action-a tenable
claim to jurisdiction over the cause and over the parties-must
be met under the state of the law as it then exists in order to
preserve judicial immunity. The inadequacy of Stump results
from the lack of direction it affords lower courts. IO By resting
the decision on a broad jurisdictional statute, the Supreme
Court failed to delineate outer limits to action by a court of general jurisdiction. The Rankin decision took a long stride toward
curing that defect.
By juxtaposing the expectational and functional factors of a
judicial act against the policy need for judicial immunity, the
Ninth Circuit shaped a clearer doctrine, more keenly attuned to
the section 19S3/Bradley conflict. Both parties to a court proceeding expect fair and even treatment at the hands of the judiciary. The Ninth Circuit recognized the importance of the two
perspectives. In contrast, the Stump Court overlooked the expectations of the sterilized minor.11 Like the grant of jurisdiction
in Stump. the probate statutes of Kansas clearly gave the defendefendant judge. who assaulted the plaintiff while ejecting him from the courtroom. was
entitled to a qualified immunity. Since the judge could have directed the baliff to evict
plaintiff. and the bailiff enjoyed immunity if he acted in good faith even while using
excessive force. the judge could claim bailiff's immunity. Id. at 64.
79. Id. at 63.
80. See Rosenberg. Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA.
L. REV. 833 (1978); Comment. Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction of Tyranny
from the Bench? 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 810 (1978); 47 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 81 (1978).
In the context of legislative immunity. the Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of immunity should not be applied broadly. but should be invoked only to the
extent necessary to effect its purpose: "[Tlhe Court has not fashioned a fixed. invariable
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry into whether the contributions of
immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring
harm to individual citizens .... " Doe v. McMillan. 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1972).
81. 435 U.S. at 363.
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dant judge in Rankin authority to order guardianships.aa But
the Ninth Circuit's determination that the judge exceeded his
functional role is premised on less literal, more realistic, considerations. Private agreements which conclude before causes commence diminish respect for the judiciary. In recognizing this, the
Rankin court achieved a more incisive use of the expectational
and functional factors.

E. A MODEL

THEORY OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

An ideal theory of judicial immunity protects judicial officers from civil reprisal for decisions made upon their well-considered convictions. Courts have constantly narrowed the scope
of immunity in the legislative and executive branches to confine
it within only the salutory bounds required. sa While it is unfair
to describe the doctrine of judicial immunity as a "judicial repeal of the Civil Rights Act,"'· it is wise to recognize the virtues
of accountability which that section contemplates.81

Arguably, those features of the judicial system that are essential to a shared concept of fairness and respectability in public opinion should be protected by a doctrine of judicial culpability. Such features might include the following: (1) notice and an
opportunity to be heard for final adjudications," (2) a colorable
82. 633 F.2d at 846 n.5.
83. Compare Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (executive officers performing
adjudicatory functions entitled to absolute immunity for that function only, because features of the judicial process enhance reliability and impartiality-citing as safeguards,
adversarial procedure, right to appeal, cross-examination and use of precedent) with
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state governor has qualified immunity) and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for state prosecutor's performance of "judicial" duties, leaving unanswered the question of liability for administrative
duties). See also Jaffe, Suits Against GOllernments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77
HARv. L. REv. 209 (1963); Note, Federal Executille Immunity From Civil Liability in
Damages: A Reellaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1977).
If the courts held that all state officials had immunity from
84.
liability under Civil Rights actions for all acts done or committed within the ostensible scope of their authority, this
would practically constitute a judicial repeal of the Civil
Rights Act. Repeal is the responsibility of Congress, not the
courts.
Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 299-300 (9th Cir. 1959).
85. For an interesting, sometimes amusing, discussion of the range and impact of
judicial misconduct, see Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal
for Limited Liability, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 549, 555-63 (1978) and citations therein.
86. Rosenberg, supra note SO, at 835 (Stump rejected procedural due process and
nonreviewability as limits on the immunity doctrine. Lack of adversary hearing should
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claim to personal and subject matter jurisdiction,'? (3) a right to
appeal,88 (4) freedom from prejudgment and partiality," and (5)
a written record. For the denigration of these fundamental elements of the American judiciary, monetary liability may be an
effective deterrent. A policy of qualified immunity for the judiciary-thereby introducing state of mind as a relevant factor-would seriously erode the benefits realized by an immunity
doctrine. eo Judicial immunity policy must seek to nurture decisions based on judicial conviction, but not to insulate lawlessness from civil redress. e1 The Rankin decision is just such an
effort.

Tom C. Clark
be seen as jurisdictional defect.).
87. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2020
(1981).
88. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 370 (1978) (Powell, J., di88enting).
89. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (due proceBB right to a
judge who has not prejudged case); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (due pr0ce88
right to a disinterested judge). Accord, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
90. Among the many articles favoring a qualified immunity, the best include: Theis,
Official Immunity and the Civil Rights Act, 38 LA. L. REv. 279 (1978); Note, supra note
85 (proposal modelled on Judicial Immunity Tenure Act); Note, Immunity of Federal
and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 727 (1977) (mechanisms for enforcing an actual malice standard); Note, Quasi·Ju·
dicial Immunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95
(1976) (all public officials exercising discretion deserve a "good faith" immunity absent
evidence that it imposes an undue restraint upon performance); Note, Liability of Judi·
cial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969) (favoring an actual malice
standard similar to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
Justice Douglas also appeared to favor qualified immunity:
The presence of malice and the intention to deprive a person
of his civil rights is wholly incompatible with the judicial func·
tion. When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to de·
prive a person of his constitutional rights he exercises no dis·
cretion or individual judgement; he acts no longer as a judge,
but as a "minister" of his own prejudices.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 567 n.6 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. French judicial officials are liable to harmed litigants for the intentional or negli·
gent discharge of their duties. The statutory 8cheme for recovery is praised by some
writers for its built·in filtering of frivolous claims. See, Note, Tort Liability: Search
Warrant Quashed: Protection Order Denied: Magistrate Negligent: Consideration of
Judicial Immunity: Possible Alternatives: French System: Malice and Negligence Stan·
dard: Re Yoner, 7 D.L.R. 3d 185 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1969), 4 OTToWA L. REv. 627, 630·31
(1971) (citing H. SOLUS, I DROIT JUDlCIAlRB PRiVE 704·11 (1961». The standard of care
demands that "serious professional error" occur before recovery is allowed. Note, supra
note 85, at 589.
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II. DAVIS v. UNITED STATES: ACCRUAL OF A CLAIM
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Davis v. United States, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that once
a plaintiff learns of the facts of both his injury and its likely
cause, the two-year statute of limitations under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (the Act) begins to run. The decision has the unfortunate effect of forcing plaintiffs to sue before legal causation
can be shown and may result in the forfeiture of some meritorioUs claims.

In March 1963, an immunization clinic administered Sabin
Type III oral polio vaccine to plaintiff as part of a governmentinitiated, mass immunization program to control poliomeylitis.'
Thirty days after vaccination, plaintiff became paralyzed from
the waist down. a He sued Wyeth Laboratories, the manufacturer
of the vaccine, in 1964.4 During this litigation, it was revealed
that the Division of Biological Standards (DBS) had tested the
lot from which plaintiff's vaccine was taken and found it within
acceptable limits. II This litigation culminated in an appeal and
the remand of the case for retrial on a strict liability theory.'
The plaintiff alleged that, in 1973, he learned of another
DBS test of the vaccine,7 the results of which fell outside the
1. 642 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Menill, J.; the other panel members were Tang,
J., dissenting, and Schroeder, J.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982).
2. Id. at 329. The immunization program stemmed from the Vaccination Assistance
Act of 1962 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1976».
3. 642 F.2d at 329.
4. Id. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
5. 642 F.2d at 329-30. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., defendant Wyeth Laboratories deposed Dr. Ruth Kirschstein, chief of the pathology section of the laboratory of
Viral Immunology, DBS, and subpoenaed her to bring all records of DBS relating to lot
no. 03503 of the Sabin Type III oral polio vaccine. DBS had subjected each lot of vaccine
to various tests. Dr. Kirschstein produced records of only a single neurovirulence test. Id.
at 329.
The test involved giving the vaccine to monkeys and then examining their brains for
lesions. If the number of lesions fell within DBS standards, the lot was acceptable. The
test on lot no. 03503 indicated that only two of the thirty monkeys developed lesions and
the lot was classified as acceptable. Id. at 329 n.2, 330 n.3.
6. 399 F.2d at 131.
7. 642 F.2d at 330. The plaintiff alleged that he learned of another test conducted
on lot no. 03503 from an attorney representing a plaintiff in another suit, Griffin v.
United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
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acceptable range. s Because Congress charged DBS9 with testing
and licensing the manufacturer of the vaccine,l° plaintiff also
sued the government under the Act. 11
The district court granted summary judgment for the government and held that the Act's two-year statute of limitations
barred recovery.12 On appeal, plaintiff contended that his cause
of action did not accrue until 1973, when he learned of facts indicating the government's responsibility for his paralysis. He
contended, in the alternative, that the government's fraudulent
concealment of the results of the second test tolled the statute. 18
B.

BACKGROUND OF THE "DISCOVERY RULE"

The general rule of tort law is that a claim accrues for statute of limitations purposes at the time of the plaintiff's injury.14
8. 642 F.2d at 330. This test revealed that one of the monkeys developed lesions
that were unacceptable under DBS standards. ld. n.S.
9. DBS was part of the National Institute of Health, United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. It was transferred to the Food and Drug Administration
and renamed the Bureau of Biologies in 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 12,865 (1972). Current authorization at 21 C.F.R. § 5.68 (1980) provides:
The Director and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Biologies ... are authorized to issue licenses under section 351 of
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 262) for propagation or manufacture and preparation of biological products as
specified in the act, and to revoke such licenses at the manufacturer's request.
10. 42 C.F.R. § 73.110 (1971) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 630 (1980» prescribes
standards for testing viral vaccines such as poliomeylitis, rubella, smallpox, and measles.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The United States shall be
liable ... , in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages."
Congress enacted the Act to eliminate the burden of providing relief through private
bills to victims of government negligence and to create a remedy that would achieve a
more equitable result in tort actions against the United States. See S. REP. No. 1400,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7 (1946).
12. The Act specifically provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever
barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless
action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by
certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the
claim by the agency to which it was presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
13. 642 F.2d at 330.
14. In the usual case, the fact of injury provides a plaintiff with adequate notice of
the cause of the injury and of the possibility that a legal wrong has occurred. See RE-
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Because the general rule was recognized as being unjust and unnecessarily harsh,lII it has been modified in medical malpractice
claims to delay accrual of the claim until the plaintiff, through
due diligence, discovers the injury. Ie
Lower courts have further extended this discovery rule to
forestall accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, should discover I both the injury and its
cause. I" In United States v. Kubrick,18 the Supreme Court
adopted this extension of the discovery rule. III The Court found
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment c at 441 (1977).
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). See also Gottlieb & Young, Medical Malpractice and Limitations Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 13 Du. L.J. 257 (1964); Sacks, Statutes 01 Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLBV.-MAR. L. REv. 65 (1967).
16. In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), the Court held that a claim under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act did not accure until a plaintiff's injury manifested itself. The court stated that the plaintiff was not barred by the statute of limitations
because:
It would mean that at some past moment in time, unknown
and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, Urie was
charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration
of his lungs [by silocosis); under this view Urie's failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a disease
whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness
would constitute waiver of his right to compensation at the
ultimate day of discovery and disability.
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended
such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance.
rd. at 169-70.
In Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962), the Fifth Circuit applied
Urie to medical malpractice claims under the Act, stating, "[w)e can see no sound reason
for permitting the Government to escape liability here simply because its alleged negligence was such as to remain undiscovered and, practically speaking, undiscoverable, for
many years thereafter." rd. at 241.
17. This rule was followed in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits. Exnicious v.
United States, 563 F.2d 418 (1Oth Cir. 1977); Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978
(4th Cir. 1977); Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975); Jordan v. United
States, 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971);
Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962), overruled on other grounds,
Ramirez v. United States, 567 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1977).
18. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
19. In Kubrick, the plaintiff was treated with neomycin at a Veteran's Administration (VA) hospital for an infection of the right femur. Irrigation of the infected area with
neomycin led to a ringing sensation and loss of hearing six weeks later. An ear specialist,
who had secured Kubrick's records from the VA, advised him that the hearing loss might
be due to the neomycin treatment. The plaintiff did not file claim against the government until later when another physician advised him that the neomycin had caused the
injury. The Court held that accrual occurred when the plaintiff was informed of the pas-
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that once a plaintiff learns of his injury and its cause, he is no
longer at the mercy of a defendant who has knowledge of these
critical facts. 2o The Court, however, reversed an additional extension of the rule by the court of appeals, and held that accrual
cannot be deferred until a plaintiff learns of a defendant's negligence or legal fault. n
C.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

Majority Opinion

In Davis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment
and held that the Act's two-year statute of limitations barred
the action. 23 The panel noted that the Kubrick Court refused to
defer accrual until plaintiff discovered that defendant was legally at fault. 3S The court stated that, "[wlith knowledge of the
fact of injUry and its cause, the malpractice plaintiff is on the
same footing as any negligence plaintiff" and that the burden is
on the plaintiff to ascertain the existence and source of fault
within the statutory period. 34 Consequently, the Davis court decided that the question of plaintiff's diligence or lack of diligence in proving fault was irrelevant,n because the statute
would begin to run in either event. The court stated that
Kubrick had made clear that once a plaintiff knows of his injury
and its cause, the decision to sue must be made within the statutory period. 36 The Davis court found that in April 1963, plaintiff
knew of his injury and that the vaccine was the likely cause; or
sibility that the neomycin caused his injury, Dot when he learned that the doctor who
had caused his injury was legally responsible. 1d. at 113-23.
20. 1d. at 122. The Kubrick Court refers to a plaintiff being in "possession of the
critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury." 1d. Although this
would appear to imply discovery of a person at fault, it is apparent from the Kubrick
decision that the Court means only discovery of the cause of injury.
21. 1d. at 121-22. The lower court had reasoned that if a claim does not accrue until
a plaintiff is aware of his injury and its cause, neither should it accrue until he knows or
should suspect that the doctor who caused his injury was medically negligent. Thus, the
court extended accrual until discovery that an injury was negligently inflicted. 581 F.2d
1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1978).
The Supreme Court stated in reversing: "[wJe are un convinced that for statute of
limitations purposes, a plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the
fact of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment." 444 U.S. at 122.
22. 642 F.2d at 330, 332.
23. 1d. at 331.
24.1d.
25.1d.
26.1d.
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that, at the latest, he knew this when he sued Wyeth Laboratories in 1964/~7 The court, therefore, concluded that the claim ac. crued at the time of injury.ls
The court also found that the government's concealment of
the results of the second test was not fraudulent and did not toll
the statute.lI9 It held that the two-year statute had run, and that,
although the government's failure to report a link between the
vaccine and subsequent cases of polio might have been negligent, the failure was insufficient to constitute fradulent concealment,80 and affirmed the defendant's summary judgment.81
The Dissent

Judge Tang dissented and indicated that the record failed
to support the majority's assumption that the plaintiff was
aware of his injury and its cause in April 1963.a• He focused on
the Kubrick Court's statement that the statute of limitations begins to run only when the plaintiff is in "possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. "aa Judge Tang examined the record to determine when
plaintiff knew the facts of his injury and its cause." The dissent
found that plaintiff was hospitalized until October 1963, and
that it was unclear when plaintiff recovered sufficiently to be
aware of anything, although the record indicated that he had
wondered in the summer of 1963 whether the vaccine had induced his paralysis. ao The record showed that, at the earliest,
plaintiff searched for the cause of his injury in October 1963.
The dissent concluded that, from the record available, the question of when the plaintiff had determined the cause of his injury
should be a factual determination for the jury."
27. rd.
28. rd.
29. rd.
30. rd.
31. rd.
32. rd.
33. rd.

n.9.
at 331.
at 332.
at 331-32.
at 332.

(emphasis supplied) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122).
34. 642 F.2d at 332.
35. rd.
36. rd. at 333. The dissent thoroughly examined the record that was available, citing
the Clerk's Transcript and letters that the plaintiff had written to various agencies and
doctors inquiring about the causal link between the vaccine and his paralysis. rd. at 33233.
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CRITIQUE

Although the majority correctly analyzed Kubrick regarding
a plaintiff's discovery of legal fault, the court failed to apply
Kubrick's ruling that the statute of limitations begins to run
only when the plaintiff possesses the critical facts of his injury
and its cause. As pointed out in the dissent, the majority assumed, without examining the record, that the plaintiff was
aware of his injury and its cause.
The majority thus misapplied Kubrick by (1) not addressing
the issue of when the plaintiff possessed the critical facts, and
(2) not examining the record. Although the Kubrick Court decided not to extend the discovery rule to defer actual accrual
until discovery of legal fault, it did affirm an extension of the
rule to defer accrual until a plaintiff was in possession of the
critical facts. 87
Other circuits have followed Kubrick in accrual questions.as
Unlike the majority in Davis, these circuits have based their
opinions upon an analysis of the record to determine when
plaintiff came into possession of the critical facts.
One recent Seventh Circuit decision, Stoleson v. United
States, at provides a sharp contrast to Davis in its application of
Kubrick. In Stoleson, plaintiff sued under the Act and alleged
heart problems resulting from employment in an ammunition
plant where she was exposed to nitroglycerin.40 She suffered a
37. 444 U.S. at 122.
38. Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980); Stoleson v. United States, 629
F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980); Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1980).
In Wollman, plaintiff sued defendant for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Because defendant was a federal employee, the case was removed to federal district
court where it was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. The Eighth
Circuit held that plaintiff was barred becaused the claim accrued at the time of the
accident when he was aware that the defendant was a federal employee and could not be
deferred until he discovered the legal significance of this fact.
In Waits, plaintiff sued the VA for negligence which he alleged resulted in the amputation of his leg. The government contended he was barred by the statute of limitations but the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff's failure to discover the specific acts of
negligence that caused the amputation rested with the VA because it delayed in producing the records of the plaintiff's treatment. Thus, plaintiff was not barred.
39. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 1266-67. The plaintiff had worked at the Badger Army Ammunition Plant
(BAAP). "During the relevant period the Olin Corporation operated BAAP pursuant to a
cost plus fixed fee contract. The district court found that the Government had pervasive
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heart attack in 1968 and suspected a link with the nitroglycerin,
but was informed by physicians that the exposure was not the
cause of her heart trouble. u In April 1971, a second, more authoritative opinion related her heart problems to nitroglycerin
exposure.4lI The district court dismissed the suit, brought in
1972, as barred by the two-year statute of limitations.48 The Seventh Circuit held that, under the Act, the statute began to run,
not when the plaintiff first suffered severe anginal attack or
when she suspected that nitroglycerin was the culprit, as the
lower court had held,4. but only when the second physician informed her of the cause and effect relationship between nitroglycerin exposure and the heart problem.411
To reach its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on Kubrick,
reasoning that U[u]nderlying Kubrick is the recognition that a
plaintiff armed with knowledge of his injury and its cause is no
longer at the mercy of a defendant's specialized knowledge. A
plaintiff in that position need only inquire of other professionals,
including lawyers, whether he has been legally wronged."4' The
Stoleson court examined the record and found that a layperson's
subjective belief is insufficient knowledge of causation to trigger
the statute of limitations.4" The court stated that the plaintiff
would have been advised that she had no cause of action against
the government had she sought legal advice after first suspecting
nitroglycerin had caused her heart problems. 41 Accordingly, the
plaintiff's suspicion did not ripen into knowledge of the missing
critical fact of causation until after she consulted a physician'"
Like the plaintiff in Stoleson, Davis at first merely suspected the polio vaccine caused his paralysis. This, according to
Stoleson, was a layperson's subjective belief. Davis was also informed that no casual connection could be proved between the
influence and authority over Olin and that the Government therefore shared with Olin
whatever duties Olin owed to its employees." Id. at 1266 n.l.
41. Id. at 1267.
42.1d.
43. rd.
44. rd. at 1270.
45. Id. at 1270-71.
46. rd. at 1269-70.
47. rd. at 1270.
48.1d.
49. rd.
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vaccine and his paralysis. lio But the Davis court never examined
the record to determine when the plaintiff's suspicion ripened
into knowledge of causation. It also never addressed the issue of
the second vaccine test or the possibility that it might have been
a missing, critical fact in plaintiff's knowledge of the cause of
injury.
The thorough analysis of an accrual question by Stoleson
applies the Kubrick holding more aptly than does the majority
opinion in Davis. Even though the Kubrick Court did not allow
the plaintiff's claim to accrue once he learned that neomycin
treatment had caused his hearing loss, it did examine the record
thoroughly to determine when plaintiff learned of the cause of
his injury.111

E.

CONCLUSION

The Kubrick Court's decision not to extend the discovery
rule to include discovery of legal wrong has been viewed as a
cutback of the liberal construction of the discovery rule. III This
cutback has been made more harsh by the Ninth Circuit in Davis. The failure to apply Kubrick to the ,facts of plaintiff's claim
has resulted in a ruling that the claim accrued at the time of
injury and was barred by the statute of limitations, even though
the question of causation was still in doubt. The Kubrick Court
stated that a strict construction of the statute would have a justified effect in malpractice cases because a plaintiff who learns of
his injury and its cause need only seek competent advice on
whether to sue. 1I1 Unfortunately, the Davis interpretation of
Kubrick has an unjust effect. A plaintiff will be required to bring
suit before causation in order to avoid the risk of having his suit
barred. As stated in Stoleson, a plaintiff who seeks legal advice
on the mere suspicion of the cause of injury, will be informed
that he has no cause of action.1I4 As a result of Davis, a plaintiff
will be caught in the position of risking suit before he is sure of
causation, and therefore not having a cause of action, or of seek50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

642 F.2d at 332.
444 U.S. at 118·24.
14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1428. 1439 (1980).
444 U.S. at 123.
629 F.2d at 1270.
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ing to find the cause and risk being barred from bringing suit.1I11
Susan A. Bush

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE
In other cases last term, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Magistrates Act to allow a trial before a Magistrate, took an expansive view of the principal of finality, adopted a new rule on
the timeliness of certain civil appeals, and allowed the district
court a measure of concurrent jurisdiction.
A.

MAGISTRATE'S PRE-AMENDMENT AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A
TRIAL ON THE MERITS

In Coolidge v. Schooner California,l the Ninth Circuit held
that the 1976 version of the Magistrates Act,· authorized a magistrate, with the consent of the parties, to conduct a trial on the
merits-provided the parties are given an opportunity to submit
objections to the district judge for a de novo review.'
In Coolidge, a trial was held before a magistrate with the
consent of the parties. Soon after, the magistrate issued his
opinion, setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The plaintiff then submitted objections to the findings but was
informed by the Clerk of the District Court that because the
55. For a general discussion of the problems aasociated with maas immunization
programs and liability for injuries, see Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization PrograT1l8: Lessons from the Polio and Flu Epi&odes, 65 CALI'. L. REV. 754 (1977).

1. 637 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Kilkenny, J.; the other panel members were
Hug, J. and Van Dusen, D.J., sitting by designation).
2. The Magistrates Act states: "A magistrate may be aasigned such additional duties
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
.§ 636(b)(3) (1976).
3. 637 F.2d at 1326. In a footnote, the panel appears to have adopted the view that
only those portions of the magistrate's opinion to which objections are raised require a
de novo review. Id. n.5. See Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse for the Blind, 630 F.2d 352,
355-56 (5th Cir. 1980).
Section 636 was amended in 1979, establishing procedures for a magistrate to "conduct any or all proceedings in a ... civil matter and order the entry of judgment. . . ."
Act of Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2,93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(l)
(Supp. III 1979».
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parties had consented to a trial by the magistrate, they had no
right to submit objections to the findings.· The district judge,
apparently without any review of the proceedings, issued his
judgment U[b]ased on the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.'"
Under section 636(b)(I)(B) of the Magistrates Act, U[a]
judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the
court proposed findings of facts and recommendations for the
disposition by the judge of the court. . . . The 1976 version of
the Act required the magistrate to mail copies of his or her proposed findings to all parties. Furthermore,
[w]ithin ten days after being served with a copy,
any party may serve and file written objections to
such proposed findings and recommendations....
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made . . . .'
Although the present version of the Magistrates Act clearly
gives magistrates jurisdiction to decide civil cases with the consent of the parties,' the Ninth Circuit panel noted that courts
disagreed as to the extent of permissible magistrate jurisdiction
prior to the 1979 amendment.-

u.

In Muhich v. Allen,IO the Seventh Circuit used a two-step
approach to review the Magistrates Act. First, the court determined that section 636 of the Act, along with local rules of court,
authorized magistrates to conduct civil trials with the consent of
the parties. Second, the court found any constitutional or statutory objections to granting magistrates this power cured by the
de novo review of a district court judge. l1 In Muhich, the review
was proper where it covered "proceedings held before the magis4. 637 F.2d at 1323.
5.Id.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(B) (1976).
7.Id.
S. For text of the present version, see note 3 supra.
9. See generally 637 F.2d at 1324 n.3 and cases cited therein.
10. 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
11. Id. at 1250-51.
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trates ... and the objections, if any, of the parties filed thereto
"11

The Ninth Circuit also relied on the Fifth Circuit decision
in Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse for the Blind. lI In Calderon,
the Fifth Circuit found that "consensual references to a magistrate for trial on the merits were permitted" under section
636(b)(3) of the Act.l. The Fifth Circuit also required the district court to conduct a de novo determination of any portions of
the magistrate's findings to which objections are raised. 1I
The Ninth Circuit held that under section 636(b)(3) a magistrate has authority to conduct a civil trial with the consent of
the parties, thereby adopting the view of the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits. The court also concluded that because the Magistrate
Act was to aid the district court in making decisions, "the parties must be given an opportunity to submit objections to the
district judge and the judge must make a de novo review."lt Applying this conclusion to the facts at hand, the court remanded
the case for a de novo review of the magistrate's opinion and the
plaintiff's objections. I.,
While the court's decision in Coolidge is a well-reasoned interpretation of the intent of section 636 of the Magistrate Act,
its value is limited to those cases which must interpret the Act
prior to the 1979 amendment. In 1979, Congress added subsection (c) which clearly vests magistrates with the power to conduct civil trials and enter judgments with the consent of the
parties.11

B.

APPEALABILITY OP A NON-FINAL ORDER

In Anderson v. Allstate Insurance CO.,lt the Ninth Circuit
held that even though an appeal is taken from a district court
12. rd. at 1262.
13. 630 F.2d 362 (6th Cir. 1980).
14. rd. at 355.
16. rd. at 356.
16. 637 F.2d at 1325·26.
17. rd. at 1327.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(I) (Supp. III 1979).
19. 630 F.2d 677 (1980) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Alarcon, J.
and Tuttle, J., sitting by designation).
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order which is not final pursuant to section 1291 of Title 28,10
and no interlocutory certificate is acquired under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,u the appellate court could treat the
orders appealed from as final orders when all the remaining
claims were disposed of subsequently.
The plaintiffs, a chiropracter and one of his employees, sued
several insurance companies and Does 1 through 5012 in state
court for violating plaintiff's first amendment rights, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and unlawful interference with
business relationships.lIS Fifteen months later, in January 1978,
the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint adding three new
defendants, but retaining the original Does 1 through 50. 24
On April 11, 1979, the defendants' petition for removal to
federal district court was granted. III On May 17, 1979, the three
new defendants moved to dismiss· on the ground that the statute
of limitations had run, since they were added as new defendants
and not Does. 2e On June 5, the district court judge dismissed the
action with prejudice with respect to the three defendants added
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) states: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the districts of the United States ...."
21.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment.
FED. R. CIY. P. 54(b).
22. The California Code of Civil Procedure allows the use of fictitiously named defendants for the purpose of protecting the statute of limitations as to those parties. CAL.
CIY. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979).
23. 630 F.2d at 679. Plaintiffs had advised their patients to seek legal counsel before
settling claims with the defendant insurance companies. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants therefore "made false and fraudulent representations to patients and prospective
patients about the quality of [plaintiff's] practice, told patients and prospective patients
that [defendants] would not pay for [plaintiff's] services; and threatened to terminate
patient's policies ...." 1d. at 684.
24. 1d. at 679.
25. On April 24, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss their federal cause of action. Because this was almost two weeks after the case had been removed to federal Court and
the state court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the federal claim, the district court retained
its jurisdiction to hear the case. 1d. at 680.
26. The statute of limitations for malicious prosecution and abuse of process is one
year. CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 340(30) (West 1979). Tortious interference with business
relations has a two-year statute. 1d. § 339(1).
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in the amended complaint. I'!'
The plaintiffs then attempted to serve these same three defendants as Does. The defendants moved to strike the amended
complaint and for sanctions against plaintiff's counsel for abuse
of process. la The district court granted these motions. The
plaintiff appealed all three district court rulings. Subsequent to
filing the appeal, the district court dismissed the federal cause of
action as to the remaining defendants and remanded the state
claims to the California courts.III
The Ninth Circuit, in granting itself jurisdiction to hear the
appeal, based its decision on policy grounds stating: "There is no
danger of piecemeal appeal confronting us if we find jurisdiction
here, for nothing else remains in the federal COurts."IO Using
finality as a basis, the court extended the holdings of several
cases from other circuits. These cases had allowed appellate review of orders which only partially adjudicated the issues when
the remaining claims were disposed of subsequently. 11 The panel
noted that the Supreme Court has mandated that "practical, not
technical, considerations are to govern the application of principles of finality."11 Finally, the court examined two previous
Ninth Circuit decisions that had granted appeals from non-final
orders of dismissal when the district court had subsequently entered judgment based on those orders. II
C. A

"WORKABLE

OF THE

UNITED

RULE"

POR DETERMINING WHO IS AN OFFICER

STATES

In Wallace v. Chappell," the Ninth Circuit held that whenever an action arises from government activities, the sixty day
period for the filing of an appeal under Federal Rule of Appel27. 630 F.2d at 680.
28.1d.
29.1d.
30. Id. at 681.
31. Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); FrankCort Oil
Co. v. Snarkard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 920 (1960).
32. 630 F.2d at 680 (quoting Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231
(5th Cir. 1973». See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
33. 630 F.2d at 681 (explaining Ruby v. Secretary oC Navy, 365 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.
1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011 (1967); Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 346
F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1966».
34. 637 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam; Poole, J., di88enting).
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late Procedure 4(a)SII will apply if the defendants were acting
under either color of office,se color of law or unlawful authority,S7
or any party in the case was represented by a government
attorney. ae
The Wallace plaintiffs, United States Naval personnel,
brought suit against their superior officers for alleged racial discrimination. ae The plaintiffs sued the defendants as individual
officers, apparently to avoid the defenses available to military
officers acting in the line of duty.40 The district court dismissed
the action and the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal thirtyfive days after the district court entered final judgment.u Rule
4(a)(1) requires that in such cases an appeal must be filed within
thirty days, but that if the United States, an officer or agency
thereof is involved, notice of appeal may be filed within sixty
days. The issue on appeal was whether the notice of appeal was
timely under Rule 4(a).
The former rule in the Ninth Circuit had been that to prevent inconsistent positions, "a plaintiff who contended (in order
to avoid a defense of immunity) that the government agent was
acting as a private citizen, could not, upon appeal, contend that
the defendant was a government officer on government business
35. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(l) requires a notice of appeal to be filed with the district
court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. This requirement is extended to 60 days
when "the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party." Id.
36. "An act under color of office is an act of an officer who claims authority to do .
the act by reason of his office when the office does not confer on him any such authority." 637 F.2d at 1348 n.6 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DlcnONARY 241 (5th ed. 1979)). "For an
act of a government officer to be under color of office. the act must have some rational
connection with his official position." 637 F.2d at 1348 n.6 (quoting Arthur v. Fry. 300 F.
Supp. 620. 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1969)).
37. Color of law is "the appearance or semblance. without the substance of legal
rights .... " 637 F.2d at 1348 n.7 (quoting BLACK'S LAw D1cnONARY (5th ed. 1979)).
The court also noted that color of law exists when acts by private individuals become
"'so closely intertwined' with the government. that private action becomes 'state action· ... 637 F.2d at 1348 n.7 (quoting Smith v. Young Men's Christian Aas·n. 462 F.2d
643. 647 (5th Cir. 1972)).
38. 637 F.2d at 1346.
39. Plaintiffs based their claim on two statutes. One. § 1985. prohibits conspiracies
to interfere with civil rights and conspiracies to prevent an officer of the United States
from performing his or her duties. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). The other. § 1341. vests
original jurisdiction in the district court for violations of § 1985 or for other relief under
an Act of Congress for the protection of civil rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
40. 637 F.2d at 1346.
41. [d.
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in order to avail himself of the 60-day rule."n
The Wallace panel found the former rule created confusion
in that the time for appeal depended on the wording of the
pleadings.n In addition, the court adjudged the defendants to
have acted inconsistently by arguing their official status in district court and their individual status for the purpose of applying Rule 4(a)."
The defendants argued that Hare v. Hurwitz'" required the
court to examine the purpose of Rule 4(a), which was to allow
cases against government agencies or officers to be routed to the
officials responsible for deciding whether to appeal.,a Applying
Hare to the present case, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to
sixty days under Rule 4(a). The court preferred a liberal reading
of Rule 4(a) to eliminate uncertainty. However, because Congress intended the words "officers of the United States to be
read in context with their activities, authority, and duties,"" a
different approach was necessary.

In formulating its new rule, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that "[a] workable rule would be one that looks to who represents the parties and the relationship of the parties to each
other and to the government during the course of the conduct
that gave rise to the action."'s Looking at the defendants' relationship to the government, the Wallace panel denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and remanded the case for oral argument on the merits.
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Poole argued that it was both
unfair to allow the plaintiff to adopt inconsistent positions and
42. ld. at 1347 (citing Michaels v. Chappell, 279 F.2d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 940 (1961».
43. 637 F.2d at 1347.
44. rd. n.2.
45. 248 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1957).
46. 637 F.2d at 1347.
47. rd.

48. ld. at 1348. The court noted that the Department of Juatice must conduct litigation involving officers or agencies of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976). In addition, a federal employee sued as an individual can request representation by the Department of Justice if it appears that the employee's activities were within the scope of
employment. rd. § 5O.15(a).
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unnecessary to overule Michaels v. Chappell.· t The proper procedure, according to the dissent, would have been for the Ninth
Circuit to dismiss the appeal and remand the action for a determination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)" of
whether to extend the time for appeal. III

49. 279 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 940 (1961). In Michaels, the
Ninth Circuit enunciated the former rule. For a discussion of this rule, see text accompanying note 42 supra.
50. Rule 6O(b) allows the district court to extend the time for filing notice of appeal
if excusable neglect or good cause is shown. FEn. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
51. 637 F.2d at 1349.
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